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Casenotes
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS - EXTINGUISHMENT
THROUGH CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
Needle v. Clifton Realty Corporation'
Suit was brought by Clifton Realty Corporation against
Needle for specific performance of a contract entered into
on July 8, 1949, by which Needle engaged to purchase from
the Realty Co. seven lots located in block #4 on the plat
of the sub-division known as Reis-Villa, located on Reisterstown Road, Baltimore, Maryland. The lots in question at
the time of the sale were unimproved ones fronting on
Reisterstown Road and designated by the Baltimore City
Zoning Board as being in a commercial use district. The
contract specified that it was the intent of the vendee to
develop the lots commercially. Needle refused to consummate the transaction on the ground that the property in
question being a part of Reis-Villa, was encumbered by a
valid restriction prohibiting commercial usage. In 1922,
when the entire area was a sparsely settled residential
district, the A. J. Watkins Realty Co. subdivided the area
into 344 lots, designating the division as Reis-Villa. During
the ensuing thirteen years the developer sold 287
of the
lots, among which were the lots in question. All of the
lots thus sold were encumbered by several restrictions,
among which was the principal one to the effect that "no
building other than a dwelling shall be erected." Through
mesne conveyances the lots in question vested in complainant. Upon the hearing it was found that Reisterstown
Road is now a heavily traveled thoroughfare, that all the
properties on Reisterstown Road in Reis-Villa are commercial, and that some of the lots in Reis-Villa that are subject
to restrictions are nevertheless being used for commercial
purposes. The Court, after finding evidence of abandonment of the original scheme as to several lots other than
the instant ones, Held:
"Under the existing circumstances the restrictive
covenants in the deed of December 17, 1923, are no
longer effective for the purpose for which they were
imposed. It is clear that the purpose of the restrictions
1

73 A. 2d 895 (Md., 1950).
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was to make the locality a suitable one for residences.
However, owing to the development of the neighborhood as a business district, this purpose can no longer
be acomplished. It would be inequitable and oppressive to give effect to those covenants. It is now settled
that a court of equity in a proper case may remove
restrictions as a cloud on title by means of a decree
for specific performance.''2
With this decision, the Court of Appeals has reiterated
a stand indicated in several prior cases and has demonstrated a firm resolve that certain real covenants may be
determined by extrinsic forces.' The decision impels a
reexamination of the how, when and why of these
forces which overcome initially valid contractual property
interests.
That one owning a fee may subject it to valid use restrictions or benefits which may survive the interest of
the instigator is no longer open to question, i.e., covenants
running with the land.' These covenants are recognized
in both law and equity. With the rapid expansion of urban
areas came the concomitant realization of the economic
and sociological benefits to be derived from schematic
planning in areas of property development. The essence
of such a scheme is the imposition of long range restrictions,
being enforceable by the present owners after the original
party has divested himself from all interest. The real
covenant has peculiarly lent itself as the instrumentality
to effectuate this result. Such covenants (in lay terminology, building restrictions) may promote development in
reference to a predetermined scheme and thereby enhance
the value of the entire tract. The validity of any attempt
to do this is dependent upon substantive features not pertinent to the problem here.
Why are sundry building restrictions imposed? Clearly
the answer is to perpetuate a human aim which at the
present, in light of past experience, and future conjecture,
seems desirable. Consequently, this aim is satisfied in the
form of building restrictions which usually accommodate
the present situation admirably, and seek to accommodate
8- Ibid,

897-8.
Talles v. Rifman, 189 Md. 10, 53 A. 2d 396 (1947); Norris v. Williams,
189 Md. 73, 54 A. 2d 331, 4 A. L. R. 2d 1106 (1947) ; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Levy,
181 Md. 488, 30 A. 2d 740 (1943) ; Whitemarsh v. Richmond, 179 Md. 523,
20 A. 2d 161 (1941) (dicta).
' Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 487 (1870) ; McKenrick v. Savings Bank, 174
Md. 118, 197 A. 580 (1938).
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the future through time limitations or indefinitely by no
limitations. Thus it may be seen that during the period
when their import is most likely to be controversial, they
are based on conjecture, pure and simple. The inherent
weakness of such a scheme is apparent. Inevitably there
must be a conflict when past human desire runs afoul of
present social change. This conflict is primarily the one
involved in the instant case and is generally reconciled in
a court of equity. Recognizing the basic fallibility of human
prowess to appraise the future with any great reliability,
it is now conceded by the great weight of authority, that
if the extrinsic forces be of sufficient moment, the bonds5
of the past must give way to the forces of the present.
These are the underlying features of this comparatively
new problem.
In the instant case the Court concluded that to enforce
the restrictions would be "inequitable and oppressive".
They were thereby saying that due to the changes occurring
during the last twenty odd years the restrictions were
rendered nugatory. These words and ones of similar import have appeared in the few Court of Appeals decisions
on the point. In deciding an analogous question in American
6 the Court
Weekly v. Patterson,
said:
"It has likewise long been a rule of equity that
where the reason for the enforcement of a restrictive
covenant on land has ceased, as where the neighborhood has completely changed, equity will no longer
enforce the covenant, as to do so would be to encumber
the economic use of land without at the same time
achieving any substantial economic benefit to the
covenantee."
That these "rules" are so clearly general merely serves to
illustrate that the practical considerations in each case are
factual and that the "rules" are merely guideposts to evaluating these facts. The tenor of the language employed by
the Maryland court is clearly in accord with the prevailing
view that when the original purpose for which the covenants were imposed has been frustrated to that degree that
it is no longer substantially obtainable, the force of the
covenants will cease to be binding. This rule is indepen5Trustees of Columbia College v. Thatcher, 87 N. Y. 311 (1881) ; Harrigan
v. Mulcare, 313 Mich. 594, 22 N. W. 2d 103 (1946) ; Elrod v. Phillips, 214
N. C. 472, 199 S. E. 722 (1938). See Annotation 4 A. L. R. 2d 1111; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, SEaVITUDES, VoL. 5, Sec. 564.
6179 Md. 109, 115, 16 A. 2d. 912 (1940).
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dent of the personal defenses to enforcement of release,"
abandonment 8 and estoppel.9 In many cases, similar to the
one under discussion, a combination of abandonment, estoppel and changing conditions will all be present in various degrees to mitigate against enforcement. Had this
proceeding been a suit to quiet title against the other lot
owners, these personal defenses would also be involved.
What are the operative facts which warrant consideration in denying enforcement? A review of the cases establishes that some degree of physical change must be present.' °
When the subdivision of Reis-Villa was established the
entire area was but sparsely residential. The purpose of the
covenants restricting the land to dwellings was to insure
its continued residential character thereby enhancing the
promotional venture. At the date of this suit it was found
that the development and its surrounding area had been
given over to business of varying nature. The question
raised was whether the original purpose could be substantially fulfilled by preserving a residential island of seven
lots in a virtual sea of commerce. The Court properly concluded that circumstances had made this impossible. In a
situation where the changes have been so manifest as here,
the courts are quite willing to deny enforcement. In Talles
v. Rifman," the Court said,
"It is only necessary to say in general that restrictions are not favored in the law, that any inhibitions
against the free transfer of land are strictly construed,
and that those making them are presumed to have
made them with reference to the conditions then existing, and if there has been a material alteration or
change in those conditions, the courts will hold that
the reason for the restrictions having been removed,
the restrictions themselves go with them."
It must be emphasized however that where the intent
is clear and the purpose obtainable, the restrictions will be
upheld. 2 In Schlicht v. Wengert,'3 an injunction was
sought by a property owner against a servient owner in
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES,

Vol. 5, Sec. 500.

8Op. cit., supra, Sec. 504.
9Op. cit., supra, Sec. 505.
10 4 A. L. R. 2d, supra, n. 5, 1116. City of Richlawn v. McMakin, 313 Ky.

265, 230 S. W. 2d 902 (1950). Effect of building restrictions is not diminished
by less stringent zoning ordinance.
1 Supra,n. 3, 15.
2Infra, n. 13. Ault v. Shipley, 189 Va. 69, 52 S. E. 2d 56 (1949).
178 Md. 629, 15 A. 2d 911 (1940).
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close proximity, who was operating a saloon on his premises. The subdivision was one of 210 lots being restricted
to residential purposes and specifically outlawing saloons,
advertisements and construction of wharves in an adjacent
cove. At the time of suit at least four saloons were operating without protest, lighted display advertisements were
within the area, and several wharves had been constructed,
all in violation of the restrictions. In addition there was
some evidence of acquiescence by the complainant in a
saloon being operated by respondent's predecessor on the
servient land, but for a short duration. The court concluded
that the quality of the neighborhood was still primarily
residential and enjoined the violation. Thus the magnitude
of the changes had not overcome the original purpose.
Commercial uses not only surrounded Reis-Villa but
had encroached upon it. Such changes both within and
without a subdivision will most generally present the
strongest case for abatement. Changes within the area
naturally lend themselves to suggest a stronger case against
enforcement than those without. Since changes within the
area most usually result from a breach, the related questions of the personal defenses usually come into play. However, whether breaches or not, they are still forces working toward the ultimate destruction of the original covenants and most definitely relate to the question of changed
conditions. However even if there have been no changes
within the restricted zone, forces without may be sufficient
to render the covenants void. The Court of Appeals was
confronted with this problem in Talles v. Rifman. 4 There
a single block had been restricted to detached dwellings
prior to the development of the adjacent area. The surrounding blocks had also been so restricted with time limitations which had expired and the area developed as row
houses. On appeal it was contended that the court was
constrained to the particular block and was not at liberty
to formulate its opinion in reference to the surrounding
unrestricted area. In its opinion the Court said, "It seems
to us obvious, in this case,... that while restrictions them-

selves may be limited to a single block, when the court
examines the reason for their imposition to determine
whether that reason continues or has ceased to exist,
its consideration should not be confined to the area restricted."' 5 Such a result was a definite recognition that
u Supra, n. 3.
Ibid, 16-17.
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the original design may be eradicated without fault, and is
in accord with the prevailing view.
There are various other operative factors which, while
usually insufficient of themselves to overthrow the restriction, are sufficient incidents of change to be considered in
every case. The property in this case bounded on Reisterstown Road, a "heavily traveled thoroughfare". The courts
have been reluctant to deliver the coup de grace to restrictions based on this fact alone,' but never reluctant to
seize upon it as a circumstance in favor of unrestricted
use.'7 The justification for this seems to be grounded on
the very plausible fact that at the inception of the plan,
this eventuality was an obvious and completely uncontrollable factor in the scheme. In conjunction with other
factors it is nevertheless a weighty consideration. In dealing with this problem of destruction of the restrictions
there is frequent language to the effect that the fact that
land may be more profitably employed, but for the restrictions, does not warrant a court of equity in so decreeing,
but that the economic standpoint is a worthy factor if
supported by other strong evidence of change.' 8
Where no set duration is imposed by the original covenants the courts conclude that the original parties intended
the restrictions to last but for a reasonable time.19 It is
equally well settled that even though a specified time may
have been stated, if conditions have since frustrated the
original purpose beyond repair, the restrictions will be
held unenforceable prior to their automatic expiration. 0
The Court of Appeals in Norris v. Williams, 21 said in part,
"We now hold that, even though the duration of a
restrictive covenant is expressly limited, equity will
not enforce the covenant where a considerable part of
the life of the covenant has elapsed, and where, owing
to a change in the character of the neighborhood, not
resulting from a breach of the covenant, the reason for
enforcement of the covenant no longer exists, and such
enforcement would merely encumber the land and injure or harass the covenantor without benefiting the
covenantee."
"Redfern Lawns Civic Ass'n. v. Carrie Pontiac Co., 328 Mich. 463, 44
N. W. 2d 8 (1950); 'Kenealy v. Chevy Chase Land Co., 72 Fed. 2d 378
(D. C. C. A., 1934).
"Hemphill v. Cayce, 197 S. W. 2d 137 (Tex. Civ. Ap., 1946).
' 8 Robertson v. Nichols, 92 Cal. Ap. 2d 201, 206 P. 2d 898 (1949).
"Norris v. Williams, 189 Md. 73, 54 A. 2d 331, 4 A. L. R. 2d 1106 (1947).
2
0Ibid.
"Ibid, 79.
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In this particular case most of the restricted period had
elapsed. The decisions frequently seize upon the relatively
short period that the covenants will survive to bolster their
decisions.2 It is submitted that this is but a recognition of
the thesis that the longer the covenants have been in operation the more likely is the divergence between the developer's anticipation of the future and actual fortuitous happenings. Should the fact that only a brief period has expired
between imposition and radically unanticipated changes
be a bar to relief?
It has thus been shown that under proper circumstances
a court of equity will refuse to enforce restrictions when
the benefits have been.neutralized by changing conditions.
As might be imagined, the equity courts entered their new
province with characteristic caution. This caution was
exemplified in some of the earlier cases by intimating or
flatly asserting that whatever the outcome in equity, the
covenants were of continuing vitality at law.2 3 This view
has not been entirely dispelled in the more recent decisions.24 Is such a result a reasonable one? If there be
any reliability in the arguments earlier advanced in this
discussion, it is suggested that, under normal circumstances,
a covenant failing in equity should fail at law. At law,
suit upon a real covenant is a suit in contract and familiar
contract principles are applied. The parties are presumed
to have contracted in reference to existing conditions at
the time of contract and but for a reasonable time. This
thesis should find strong support in the contract principle
of increasing application that contracts may fail when there
has been a destruction of the subject matter, failure of
the contemplated means of performance, or frustration of
the contractual objective without culpability of the parties.25 The doctrine of complete destructibility is supported
by some very persuasive authorities. Dean Pound was one
of the notable expositors of such a view.
"It is submitted that the sound course is to hold
that when the purpose of the restrictions can no longer
be carried out the servitude comes to an end; that
the duration of the servitude is determined by its purpose. If imposed for a fixed time, it will last no longer,
but it may not last so long if the purpose becomes unIbid.
Getchal v. Lawrence, 121 Misc. Rep. 359, 201 N. Y. Supp. 121 (1923).
'Equitable Servitudes - Defenses, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1394, 1395 (1949)
Lacov v. Ocean Ave. Bldg. Corp., 257 N. Y. 362, 178 N. E. 559 (1931).
21 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, Vol. 1, Sec. 281, Vol. 2, Sec. 454.
2
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attainable in the meantime. When the original purpose can no longer be carried out, the same reasons
that established its existence are valid to establish its
termination. There is then nothing left to protect by
injunctionand nothing for which to award damages."'
The writer discovered no Maryland cases wherein the
court abrogated the restrictions but preserved the remedy
at law. Is the language employed in the Talles"7 case
"... if there has been a material alteration or change in
those conditions, the courts will hold that the reason for
the restrictions having been removed, the restrictions
themselves go with them"2 strong enough to indicate a
disposition of our high court? It is submitted that such a
disposition would be well rooted in principle.
In the instant case, it may be recalled that the operative
changes had occurred both within and without the subdivision. The periphery of a restricted division is most
vulnerable to the brunt of the first commercial onslaught.
In fact, the existence of a strictly residential area will probably prove of great inducement for encroaching commerce.
Where this situation results, the fringe area of the development will most certainly prove less desirable for residences.
Whether this situation is to be relieved against in equity
is a question upon which there is little uniformity of
opinion. Of course, if the extrinsic forces are strong
enough they may overcome the entire plan from without
as has been demonstrated by the Talles case.29 But where
the original scheme has not been frustrated beyond repair,
should the court indulge in piece-meal destruction of the
development? Those courts answering in the affirmative
seem to be swayed by the consequent hardship to the first
line lots and their virtual disuse for the residential purposes to which they were committed.' It is undoubtedly
true that their residential value may be seriously impaired.
The other line of decisions describes the above principle
as in effect a license by equity for the systematic destruction of the entire scheme. Under the view that such destruction does violence to the original scheme, these latter
courts regard the periphery as a sort of buffer zone so long
21 The Progress of the Law, Equitable Servitudes, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 813,
821 (1920). Emphasis supplied.
Supra, n. 3, 15.
Emphasis supplied.
Supra, n. 3.
80Putnam v. Ernst, 232 Mich. 682, 206 N. W. 527 (1925).
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as the original scheme is still primarily intact.3 1 Upon first
impression the latter view may appear unduly harsh. However, it should be considered that the parties conducted
their bargain in reference to the known facts. Important
among these facts was the knowledge that certain lots in
the subdivision bordered on unrestricted land suitable to
business usage. With this knowledge is it not reasonable
to assume that such was a controlling feature in determining the price of the bargain. By a consistent application
of this latter precept the court would effectuate and preserve the restrictions while they are still substantially beneficial for the purpose for which they were imposed.
The older view expressed in some cases that no affirmative relief would be given 32 has been uniformly overruled.
It now appears that the question of validity of building
restrictions may be tested by suits for injunction, 3 to quiet
title,3 4 specific performance of contracts of sale, 5 and more
recently declaratory judgments.36 From the nature of
these various actions it may be perceived that different
proofs and parties are involved. With the exception of
the Schlicht case which was one for injunction, the remainder of the Maryland cases appear to have been instituted for specific performance. In a restricted subdivision
each lot owner has a right of enforcement against every
other lot owner, and each lot is servient to every other lot.
Now as a practical matter many of these rights are rendered
nugatory by the personal defenses of abandonment and
estoppel. These personal defenses in conjunction with extrinsic changes are the ones which militate against continued enforcement of the covenant. Thus, any suit in
which the court passes upon the validity of the covenants
should be subject to the defenses available to any lot owner
in the entire subdivision. In cases for specific performance
of a contract to sell land within the division are these defenses presented? It must be admitted that in the majority
of Maryland cases they are not. The instant case was one
for specifice performance. Behind the opinion itself the
pleadings sufficiently indicate that it was in fact a "friendly"
81
Continental Oil v. Fennemore, 38 Ariz. 277, 299 Pac. 132 (1931) ; Cuneo
v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 337 Ill. 589, 169 N. E. 760 (1929) ; 54 A. L. R.
812, 85 Id. 980.
mCondert v. Sayre, 46 N. J. Eq. 386, 19 A. 190 (1890).
8 Schlicht v. Wengert, aupra, n. 13.
31Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
Ford v. Union Trust Co. of Md., 75 A. 2d 113 (1950).
MMd. Code (1951), Art. 31A. Levy v. Dundalk Co., 177 Md. 636, 11 A. 2d
476 (1940).
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suit. The respondent had no desire to avoid the contract
if the property could be employed commercially without
violating the restrictions. The defense was limited in its
convincing portions to a flat assertion that the obnoxious
covenants did run with the land in the first instance. This
was sufficient to bring the question of their current validity
before the court. No substantial argument was directed
against the changes in the neighborhood or the legal effect
thereof. So far as complainant was concerned it obviously
sought a finding of invalidity and promoted extensive
testimony to demonstrate the far reaching changes that
had occurred over the years. The lower court upon dismissing respondent's petition to join the original developer,
directed that other interested parties to the suit be joined.
It does not appear that any were joined. The point of
concern is that the respondent to the suit was not the real
party to defend a suit, which in practical result will unavoidably affect other lots in the subdivision. The other
property owners may not be said to have been present
through the doctrine of representation since it is most obvious that the parties to the suit did not have adverse
interests. It is not suggested that in the instant case the
court reached an improper result, but the writer merely
wants to point out the possibility of error in such a procedure when other interested parties are not joined. It is
a familiar principle that a court may only pass on the
issue before it. In the motion for rehearing of Barton v.
Moline Properties,37 the Florida court added:
"It may be further stated that the decree in this
case must be deemed and considered as applying only
to that particular lot of the subdivision upon which the
restriction is sought to be lifted and should in no way
affect restrictions as applied to other lots in the subdivision."
It is an equally recognized maxim that interests definitely
relevant to a question before a court should be litigated in
one and the same proceeding where the proofs will permit,
thereby giving a hearing to interested parties and concluding litigation. In the actions for injunction to quiet title
and declaratory judgment, this purpose would seem better
served than in the prevalent use of specific performance.
In some of the earlier cases cited above, both in this
jurisdiction and others language appears to the effect that
121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551, 557 (1935).
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relief will only be granted where changes have occurred,
other than by breach of the restrictions," which destroy
the original intent of the subdivision. The justification for
this statement is not immediately evident; but if it is but a
manner of stating that when a party seeking relief from
the restrictions has been guilty of prior breaches himself
he will be denied relief on the "clean hands doctrine", it
is a valid consideration. If it is to be literally interpreted,
it may well result in a disregard of many of the changes
occurring within the subdivision which are the very factors
generally conceded to be most potent. If the latter be the
true interpretation it is noticeable that the court made no
mention of this principle in the instant case.
From this discussion it may be concluded that building
restrictions may be determined solely by extrinsic forces.
The Maryland decisions and the weight of authority seem
firmly dedicated to the principle that originally valid covenants running with the land may be extinguished by changing physical forces beyond the control of the interested
parties, which so effectively conflict with the original
scheme of development as to make its purpose no longer
obtainable and continued enforcement "oppressive and inequitable". That the ultimate application of this principle
is primarily a factual one is but a truism. The relevant
factors are the size of the restricted property, its location
in reference to where the change has occurred, the conduct
of the parties and their predecessors, the nature of the
change that has taken place, the purpose for which the
restriction was imposed, and to some extent the unexpired
term of the restrictions.

RIGHTS OF A TRUSTEE OF BANKRUPT ESTATE TO
ABANDON BURDENSOME ASSETS IN CONTRAVENTION OF FEDERAL NAVIGATION ACTS
Ottenheimer v. Whitaker1
In the principal case a most unusual and novel set of
circumstances was presented to the court. The appellant,
trustee in Bankruptcy of the Eastern Transportation Company had petitioned the Referee in Bankruptcy for leave
to abandon, as burdensome assets of the estate, three obso-

3Norris

v. Williams, 189 Md. 73, 54 A. 2d 331, 4 A. L. R. 2d 1106 (1947).

'198 F. 2d 289 (4th Cir., 1952).

